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ABSTRACT 
The paper uses macro panel data on US FDI in developed countries during 
1982-2010 to empirically investigate the influence of host country 
characteristics on FDI. Differing from earlier panel data studies on FDI 
determinants which often impose the standard restrictions of the homogeneity 
of slope coefficients on the observed variables and the homogeneity of the 
factor loadings on the unobserved common factors in the empirical 
specification, this paper allows the effects of observed variables and 
unobserved common factors to vary across countries by using recently-
introduced estimators. In this research, the data seem to support the empirical 
specification allowing for slope heterogeneity across countries rather more 
than the standard ones imposing the restrictions of slope homogeneity. 
Empirical results indicate that the stock of US FDI in a given FDI recipient is 
likely to be significantly determined by market size, lower relative tax rates, 
and risks in terms of the investment climate, corruption and the legal 
environment of the host country.  
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“As long as a branch of science offers an abundance of problems, so long is it 
alive” – David Hilbert, 1900 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence of host country factors on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States (US) to developed 
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) from 1982 until 2010.  
There are two major problems relating to the empirical estimation in the FDI-
determinant literature using aggregate panel data at the country level. Firstly, 
earlier studies often use standard panel estimation methods such as Pooled 
OLS (POLS) or Fixed Effects (FE). In these cases, the slope parameters for the 
observed explanatory variables are typically constrained to be constant across 
recipients. This restriction can be too strong since the impact of a given factor 
on FDI may be different for different recipients. Given that the observed panel 
samples have a long time series dimension in this study, it could be more 
informative to allow the parameters to be heterogeneous across recipients. 
Secondly, previous macro-panel studies have often controlled for unobserved 
common factors with the restriction that the effect of the common factors is 
homogeneous across FDI recipients. However, common factors are likely to be 
diverse. For example, they may be global events such as the recent financial 
crisis. Additionally, in the context of investigation of the determinants of FDI 
from an investing country to a cross-section of host countries, the common 
factors could also be related to advanced knowledge, technological expertise or 
superior managerial systems of the investing country’s firms. Those factors 
may affect FDI1 and thus they should be accounted for. Using aggregate 
                                                 
1
 For example, see Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969). 
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country-level panel data, it may be difficult to correctly measure the common 
factors, but failing to control for them could lead to misleading inference. 
Furthermore, since common factors are diverse, it is reasonable to believe that 
the impact of them could be heterogeneous across different host countries.2  
There are three reasons why a panel sample of US FDI in developed OECD 
countries is used here. Firstly, according to statistical data from the 
UNCTADstat database of the United Nations, the US has been the world’s 
largest investing country, in terms of FDI, for several decades. Secondly, 
developed OECD countries are the largest recipients for total global FDI. Data 
from the UNCTADstat database show that the stock of FDI in OECD countries 
accounts for approximately seventy percent of the total FDI stock of the world 
over the last thirty years. As for the overseas direct investment of US firms, 
OECD countries are also the largest destination, accounting for more than two-
thirds of the total stock of outbound US FDI for the last three decades 
according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Thirdly, annual data 
on variables in our model are likely to be more reliable and available 
consecutively for the developed countries in comparison with developing 
countries. 
The focus of this study is the analysis of the determinants of US FDI to OECD 
countries rather than a two-way study. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, one 
of the limitations of such a two-way study is that the parameters for a given 
recipient country are likely to vary across investing countries, and hence in 
practice, a flexible approach to a two-way study is likely to require that models 
are estimated separately (investing) country-by-country. By focusing on just 
                                                 
2
 For example, the average advantage of technology of US firms over German firms may be 
different from those of US firms over Greek firms or Portuguese firms. Thus, the impacts of 
the advantage of the technology on FDI from the US to the host countries such as Germany, 
Greece and Portugal may be heterogeneous. 
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FDI from the US to host countries, this study can examine that case in more 
depth and allow for slope parameter heterogeneity in the estimates. Also, the 
focus on US FDI to a cross-section of countries enables us to control for 
factors such as the (average) relative knowledge or technology advantages of 
the investing country’s firms as unobserved common factors in the analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the 
literature review. Section three discusses the model, data and empirical 
methods used in this study. Section four reports empirical results and, finally, 
section five provides the conclusion of the research. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a number of theories of FDI. For example, the database of the 
Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) lists over eight thousand references for 
foreign direct investment. Therefore, this literature review can be only 
selective. Before the 1960s, most theories such as Iversen (1935) and 
Markowitz (1959) explained overseas investment based on the assumption of 
perfect markets. However, Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) argued that 
in a perfectly competitive market, all firms compete equally and have no 
advantages over each other, so that FDI has no reason to exist. In his doctoral 
thesis of 1960, later published in 1976, Hymer showed that firms operating in 
foreign markets often face a variety of disadvantages compared to indigenous 
firms, for example language differences or lack of customer tastes. Faced with 
these disadvantages, for a firm to engage in investment in foreign markets, it 
must possess specific ownership advantages such as knowledge or technology 
to balance the disadvantages of operation in a foreign country. Specific-
ownership advantage is a source of market power to help a firm to expand its 
operation into foreign markets. This is a reason for foreign direct investment. 
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Despite pointing out the importance of the ownership advantage for FDI, 
Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) do not explain how multinational firms 
(MNFs) may benefit from such an advantage (Agarwal, 1980; Rugman, 1986). 
This point is addressed in the theory of internalisation proposed by Buckley 
and Casson (1976) which will be discussed below. However, firstly, this study 
reviews some major theoretical approaches to the debate on the theory of FDI. 
Apart from the theory of market power proposed by Hymer and by 
Kindleberger, Vernon (1966, 1971) used the concept of the product life cycle 
to explain FDI.  Vernon suggested that the production of a commodity goes 
through three distinct stages, including the ‘new’, then the ‘mature’, and finally 
to the ‘standardised’ commodity. In the first stage when the product is new, it 
is firstly designed and manufactured in home developed markets whose 
infrastructure and market conditions can facilitate the innovation of new 
products. The second stage is when the product is maturing, the designs of new 
products become accepted and the production process is stabilised. At that 
time, demand would develop for the product in overseas markets where high-
income customers welcome innovation and are willing to pay a high price for 
it. Therefore, firms should expand their sales by exporting their commodities to 
other developed countries whose consumers have similar purchasing power to 
that of the home country. 
Finally, when the product is standardised in its production, technological 
inputs and market knowledge are not very important. At that time, firms search 
for lower-cost locations abroad, particularly in less developed countries, in 
order to obtain cost advantages. At this stage, the product is manufactured in 
the less developed countries to serve their domestic consumers and to export 
back to the home countries and other developed countries. The firm may thus 
be able to increase its market share. 
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However, the theory of a product life cycle is mainly restricted to industries 
characterised by a high level of innovation (Solomon, 1978). In addition, this 
theory most likely addresses the position of US firms in the 1950s and 1960s 
when they were leaders in production innovation. Today new products are 
introduced at the same time in many different countries and production 
facilities can be located in many countries right from the beginning, because 
the technology and income gap between the US and other countries has 
narrowed since the 1970s (Moosa, 2002). Therefore, this theory is likely to be 
of lesser importance in the explanation of FDI activities of firms today (Giddy, 
1978; Clegg, 1987).  
Closely related to the product-life-cycle theory suggested by Vernon is the 
oligopolistic-reaction theory proposed by Knickerbocker (1973) which 
considers FDI as the response of a mature firm in an oligopolistic market to its 
competitors’ decision to carry out direct investment overseas.  In an 
oligopolistic environment, firms follow each other into foreign markets as a 
defensive strategy, because the firm that takes the first step in a new market 
exploiting any business opportunity draws the attention of similar firms that 
may exploit the same opportunities. However, the theory is sometimes said to 
be limited in explaining FDI, because it can only explain why oligopolistic 
firms invest defensively to counter the FDI of the initiating firm, but cannot 
explain the investment made by the initial firm.  
A theory of currency area explains FDI based on the role of fluctuations of the 
exchange rate. This theory gives two different explanations of the effect of the 
exchange-rate fluctuations on FDI. The first argues that the exchange rate is 
often volatile, thus firms seek FDI to avoid the volatility of the exchange rate 
(Aliber, 1970; Cushman, 1985). A country with a high variation of its 
exchange rate may see an increase in inward FDI. In contrast, Kohlhagen 
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(1977) and Benassy-Quere et al. (2001) argue that a host country with large 
fluctuations of the exchange rate may deter inward FDI because investors 
worry that these fluctuations may lead to uncertainty over the economic 
environment of that country.  
Differentiating from the theory of currency area, Rugman (1976) and Lessard 
(1976) put forward another theory based on risk diversification. FDI in this 
theory is explained as a way for firms to spread risk from solely producing 
domestically. However, Caves (1996) asserts that the diversification of MNFs 
is more likely to result from investments that were propelled by other motives. 
Unlike the theories above, Kojima (1977) argues that FDI is a means to exploit 
factor endowments in the host country. He states that the flow of FDI should 
target countries which can be assisted by the inputs of the investing firm in 
industries where the home country is disadvantaged. Using the case of Japan, 
he argues that Japanese firms tend to launch FDI in industries such as textiles, 
iron and steel, and assembly of motor vehicles and electronics which are less 
well-suited for manufacturing in Japan because of the lack of labour and 
resources, and strict policies on pollution. Petrochilos (1989) criticises this 
theory in that it is mainly relevant to the Japanese context. Thus it does not 
provide a general explanation of FDI.  However, to some extent, Kojima’s 
theory seems to be within the notion of locational advantages in the eclectic 
theory which will be discussed below. 
The differences in endowments between the investing country and the host 
country are also stressed as important motives for FDI in the theory of vertical 
FDI by Helpman (1984). In the theory, firms can separate their activities 
geographically to exploit the differences in endowments (e.g. labour costs). 
Differentiating from the theory of vertical FDI, Markusen (1984) puts forward 
a theory of horizontal FDI. According to this theory, MNFs conduct FDI to 
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serve the local market of the host country from local production in order to 
save on trade costs. In this theory, the important motivation for the horizontal 
FDI is the host country’s market size and trade costs. These motives could be 
considered as locational factors in the eclectic theory. 
Another theoretical approach to explain FDI is the theory of internalisation as 
suggested by Buckley and Casson (1976). Whereas Hymer (1976) and 
Kindleberger (1969) emphasise the importance of ownership advantages, 
Buckley and Casson stress internalisation advantages as an explanation of 
overseas investment of MNFs. The idea of internalisation theory originated 
from Coase (1937) who used the concept to explain the growth of multi-plant 
domestic firms. He argued that if transaction costs in external markets - for 
instance, contractual obligations or contract prices - were high, firms would 
internally conduct these transactions within the firm at a lower cost.  
Applying Coase’s internalisation approach to explain FDI, Buckley and 
Casson (1976) argue that firms prefer to exploit their ownership advantages 
such as knowledge or technology by transferring them within an internal 
structure (e.g. from its headquarters to subsidiaries). When the internalisation 
is undertaken across national borders, FDI occurs. According to Buckley and 
Casson (1976), the internalisation process helps investors to be able to ensure 
product quality as well as to keep their ownership-specific advantages within 
their internal firms. In addition, through the internalisation, MNFs may avoid 
time lags and high transaction costs.  
In general, along with the theory of market power suggested by Hymer and 
Kindleberger, internalisation theory offers an insight into the operations of 
MNFs. However, it cannot explain fully the aspects of FDI as a general theory 
(Parry, 1985; Dunning, 1988). Theories of market power and internalisation 
seem to be able to explain only why a firm seeks FDI (because it possesses one 
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or some ownership-specific advantages) and how it can exploit ownership 
advantages (by internalisation), but cannot fully explain why the distribution of 
FDI varies across countries. In other words, the theories are likely to be unable 
to provide an ‘explicit’ explanation regarding the location of FDI. This is 
addressed by the eclectic theory suggested by Dunning (1981, 1988) which is 
presented below. 
The eclectic theory combines ownership, internalisation advantages and 
locational advantages within a single paradigm in order to interpret the main 
influences on FDI. According to the eclectic theory, for a firm to engage in 
FDI activities, the decision problem needs to satisfy the three following 
conditions. Firstly, a firm must possess certain advantages that provide it with 
comparative advantages in the host market. These advantages largely take the 
form of intangible assets (e.g. knowledge or technology) that are exclusive or 
specific to the firm possessing them, which are called ownership-specific 
advantages. Secondly, assuming a firm possesses one or some ownership-
specific advantages, it must be more efficient for the firm to internally exploit 
its specific ownership advantages overseas by itself, rather than to sell them to 
foreign firms through market transactions. This is called an internalisation 
advantage, which explains how a MNF can exploit the profitability from their 
ownership-specific advantages. Thirdly, the host country must possess 
location-specific advantages that help firms to be able to make profits when 
operating there. The locational advantages can explain the location of FDI. 
Among the theories of FDI, the eclectic theory is widely accepted as a general 
theory of FDI because it synthesises different theories of FDI (Dunning, 1992; 
Moosa, 2002). The eclectic theory encompasses ownership advantages in 
Hymer (1976) and Kinderberger (1969), the process of internalisation in 
Casson and Buckley (1976) and location-specific advantages including FDI 
10 
 
determinants suggested in Kojima’s theory, theory of currency area and 
theories of vertical and horizontal FDI. Therefore, it can give a comprehensive 
explanation for many aspects of FDI activities. In terms of determinants of 
FDI, it can be seen that the ‘original’ factors determining FDI in the 
perspectives of ownership advantages and internalisation advantages are likely 
to be similar. They often are ownership-specific factors such as advanced 
technology or superior managerial systems, whereas locational advantages 
refer to factors relevant to the host countries’ characteristics, for instance, 
market size or labour costs. 
In the empirical literature on FDI determinants, macro-panel analyses often 
include location-specific factors, or more specifically host-country factors, 
rather than ownership-specific factors, to explain the variation of FDI across 
countries. This is so because the characteristics of the host country play key 
roles in the location of FDI. Hence, the current research concentrates on 
locational factors to explain the variation in US FDI across OECD countries. 
The focus on locational determinants also arises from the difficulty in 
measuring correctly ownership-specific factors at the country level. In the 
eclectic theory, though there are many locational factors that may determine 
FDI, which ones are important remains an empirical matter. Given a number of 
potential locational determinants of FDI, the research in this study focuses on 
factors which are widely included in empirical studies. The factors that are 
used in this study are as follows. 
Market size 
The size of the host country’s market is generally considered as a potential 
locational factor determining FDI. Multinational firms often choose to invest in 
a country whose market is large enough, so that their turnover can exceed, at 
least, various costs of operating in an unfamiliar market (Davidson, 1980; Nigh 
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1985). A large market size of the host country can provide investors with the 
opportunity to capture economies of scale and to increase their profit 
(Scaperlanda and Mauer, 1969). However, evidence in some studies such as 
Yang et al. (2000) indicates an insignificant association between the host 
country’s market size and FDI. Therefore, the hypothesis of a significant and 
positive association between the size of the host country’s market size and FDI 
is not always supported in the empirical literature. This study includes market 
size in the model to test its effect on US FDI to OECD countries in the period 
1982-2010. 
Relative tax rates 
Along with the size of the market, the taxation of a country commonly appears 
as a potential factor that may impact on FDI. A country with high tax rates 
may deter investors from locating their FDI there because the high tax rates 
can increase their costs and decrease their after-tax profits. Thus, the tax rates 
of the host country are expected to influence FDI negatively. However, 
evidence in some empirical works such as Wheeler and Mody (1992) and 
Swenson (1992) does not support the hypothesis of a negative relationship 
between tax rates and FDI. The model in this study takes relative tax rates 
between the host country and the US into account to test the impact of relative 
tax rates on FDI from the US to the host country for 1982-2010. 
Relative labour costs 
Labour costs frequently play an important role in determining FDI. Lower 
labour costs can help a firm to reduce its operation costs and production costs 
and thereby increase its profit. Therefore, higher labour costs in the host 
country relative to the investing country may lead to a decrease in FDI from 
the investing country to the host. Empirical evidence, however, does not 
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always support the hypothesis of a negative relationship between labour costs 
and FDI in recipient countries. For example, works by Koechlin (1992) and 
Loree and Guisinger (1995) find an insignificant relationship between labour 
costs and US FDI. This study controls for relative labour costs between 
recipient countries and the US in the model and examines its influence on US 
FDI to the recipients. 
Relative skilled labour 
Along with labour costs, the availability of skilled labour is commonly 
suggested as a potential factor that may determine the location of FDI. When 
MNFs establish affiliates in a foreign location they often bring knowledge and 
technology, which may require skilled labour in the location where they 
operate. Therefore, a country with skilled labour in abundance may attract 
more inflows of FDI, other things equal. In the empirical literature, labour 
skills are often measured by the gross secondary school enrolment rate or the 
literacy rate. Empirical studies such as Narula (1996) and Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) show a significant and positive relationship between the skilled labour 
endowment and inward FDI, while other studies, for instance, Schneider and 
Frey (1985) and Wei (2000), find that this relationship is insignificant. In this 
study, we take account of the skilled labour abundance of the recipient country 
relative to that of the US to investigate its impact on FDI from the US to the 
recipient. 
Openness 
Besides market size, tax rates, labour costs and skilled labour abundance, the 
openness of the host country is frequently mentioned as a potential factor that 
may affect the FDI decision-making of MNFs. Openness here is often a 
measure of the degree of openness of a country to international business. In 
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empirical studies, the influence of openness on overseas direct investment 
seems to be ambiguous. Studies such as Culem (1988) and Moosa and Cardar 
(2006) find that the effect of openness on FDI is significant and positive while 
other studies such as Schmitz and Bieri (1972) and Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
find that this effect is insignificant. In this current study, we try to investigate 
the influence of the openness of the host country on US FDI to OECD 
countries. In view of the mixed results of the existing literature, the study tries 
to shed light on the significance of openness in the US-OECD context. 
Fluctuations of the exchange rate 
Another factor often considered as a potential factor which may influence FDI 
is the fluctuations of the exchange rate. Yet the empirical literature provides 
mixed results on the association between exchange rate fluctuations and FDI. 
Some empirical studies, for example those by Cushman (1988) and Goldberg 
and Kolstad (1995), find that the effect of exchange rate variability on FDI is 
significantly positive, while other studies, for instance those by Itagaki (1981) 
and Benassy-Quere et al. (2001), find that the fluctuation of the exchange rate 
has a significantly negative influence on FDI. Some other studies, such as 
those by Gorg and Wakelin (2002) and Crowley and Lee (2003), report an 
insignificant association between exchange rate variability and FDI. The 
inclusion of the fluctuations of the exchange rate as a driver for FDI is also 
controversial from a theoretical point of view. FDI is a long-term investment 
while exchange rate fluctuations are short-term. Furthermore, over the last 
thirty years or so, financial markets have become quite sophisticated in that 
exchange rate risk can often be hedged at relatively low cost. Thus, whether 
exchange rate variation is still an important variable in determining FDI is 
largely an empirical matter. This study controls for the fluctuation of the 
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exchange rate by including a measure of exchange rate variability in the model 
to check for its effect on FDI. 
Trade costs 
Apart from the factors above, trade costs may be another factor affecting FDI. 
This is because if trade costs between the investing country and the host 
country are high, firms may switch from exports to FDI to serve the host 
country’s market from local production. Hence, trade costs are included in the 
model to investigate their effect on FDI from US to the host countries. 
Political risks 
Additional factors such as political risks are likely to be a potential factor 
which investors consider carefully before making a FDI decision. These risks 
are commonly related to the investment climate, corruption, internal conflicts, 
ethnic or religious tensions, external conflicts and the legal environment in the 
host country. Since firms tend to avoid uncertainty and risks, a host country 
with a high extent of political risk may discourage investors. Based on 
different proxies, some empirical studies, for example those by Schneider and 
Frey (1985), Nigh (1985), Lee and Mansfield (1996) and Janicki and Wunnava 
(2004), provide evidence that political risks significantly influence FDI, while 
some others, such as those by Bennett and Green (1972), Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) and Bevan and Entrin (2004), find little evidence for a correlation 
between political risks and FDI. In this study, since we are interested in FDI in 
developed countries where risks relevant to major ethnic or religious tensions, 
and severe external or internal conflicts are comparatively rare, these particular 
factors are excluded from the model. Nevertheless, there may remain some 
political risks, and the model takes account of the investment climate, 
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corruption and the legal environment of the recipient country in order to check 
the effect of these risks on FDI from the US. 
Above, this study discussed the FDI determinants to be investigated in the 
empirical analysis. The next section presents the model, data and estimation 
methods of the research. 
III. MODEL, DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS 
This section discusses the model, data and empirical methods used in this 
study. The first presents the model and data sources while the second discusses 
the main empirical methods used in this research. 
III.1. The empirical model and data 
The discussion of the determinants of FDI in the previous section suggests the 
following possible relationship: 
FDI = GDP, TAX, COST, SKILL, OPEN, FER, TC, RISK				1 
where i and t denote FDI-recipient country and time indexes respectively. FDI 
denotes US foreign direct investment in each recipient country; GDP proxies 
for the recipient country’s market size, measured as total output. TAX, COST 
and SKILL denote the relative tax rates, relative unit labour costs and relative 
skilled labour abundance between the recipient country and the US 
respectively. TC denotes trade costs between the US and the recipient country. 
OPEN, FER and RISK denote the recipient country’s openness, fluctuations of 
the exchange rate and political risks respectively.  
Model (1) is conventionally expressed in multiplicative form as: 
FDI = GDPTAXCOSTSKILLOPEN FER!TC"RISK#expε	 
where the βs denote elasticities and εit denotes the error term.        															2 
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Taking the natural logarithms of equation (2) yields a log-linear form as 
follows: 
ln FDI = β/ ln GDP + β1 ln TAX +	β2 ln COST + β3 ln SKILL															 
+β4 ln OPEN + β5 ln FER + β6 ln TC + β7 ln RISK + ε	3 
where ln denotes natural logarithm. This log-linear form allows us to interpret 
the coefficients as elasticities. In addition, it could help to reduce the potential 
problem of heteroscedasticity in the error variance. 
Model (3) is a static model. However, information on FDI determinants often 
becomes available with a lag relative to the time of the investment decision. In 
addition, there may be an additional lag from the decision-making process to 
actual FDI. Therefore, the effects of explanatory variables in the model (3) 
could be expected to appear with a delay. For example, in year t investors 
intend to invest overseas while the available information is from the previous 
year. Furthermore, the decision making process and the preparation for FDI 
such as the mobilization of funds, the building of partners, negotiations with 
the host country, etc., will take additional time. Overall, it may take two years 
or more before FDI is carried out in the host country. Hence, we experiment 
with two possible lag lengths, of one and two years. It is thought that a two-
year lag is likely to be sufficient, considering that the data are annual and the 
sample size is relatively small. Even though there may be common-sense 
reasons for the variables to have delayed effects, there is no formal theory of 
dynamic adjustment in the literature and the determination of the appropriate 
lag length is an empirical matter. Further, lag specifications for the explanatory 
variables would also be useful in order to avoid the potential simultaneous 
influence of the dependent variable on the explanatory variables. 
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It may also be argued that leads (i.e., forward-looking variables) could be 
included to extend the dynamics in order to account for the role of 
expectations. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that investors may decide 
to invest in a country not only on the basis of past growth, but perhaps even 
more so based on future expected growth, since the latter may be regarded as 
more important for the success of the investment. However, including 
expectations of future growth is difficult in this setting due to the lack of 
availability of data on expected values of variables in the model for the entire 
group of countries over the period. Including leads, instead, may approximate 
expectations to some degree. However, the implication of the lead is perfect 
foresight which appears to be a rather strong assumption for the variables 
within the model. For instance, forecasts for GDP can be unreliable, 
particularly at long horizons, which are relevant for FDI decisions. Therefore, 
no experiment with the use of leads was attempted. This is also consistent with 
most of the existing literature on FDI. 
In this study, the dependent variable is measured by the real US FDI stock in 
each recipient country.3 Data on the nominal US FDI stock are from the BEA, 
and are converted into constant 2005 US dollars (in millions) using the GDP 
deflator. The latter is from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) provided 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data on the US FDI stock from the 
BEA are available from 1982 onwards, only.  
Real gross domestic product is used as a measure of the size of the host 
country’s market. Data on GDP are collected from the World Economic 
                                                 
3
 Strictly speaking, the dependent variable should be FDI flow. However, US FDI stock is used 
here because a fairly large part of data on US FDI flow is unavailable. In addition, available 
data on US FDI flow are inconsecutive. Besides, data on US FDI flow have negative values, 
and thus it could not take log of those [as in model (3) above]. 
Note that the value of FDI stock of US in a given recipient country in year t is not always 
larger than that in year t-1 because of the disinvestment. 
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Outlook of the IMF, and then are converted into constant 2005 US dollars (in 
millions) by using GDP deflators and corresponding exchange rates. Exchange 
rates are collected from the IFS.  
We use the corporate income tax rate as a proxy for the tax rate in order to 
construct the relative tax rates between the host country and the US. Data on 
corporate income tax rates of the US and host countries were collected from 
the Centre for Tax Policy and Administration of the OECD.  
The variable COST measures unit labour costs of the host country relative to 
those in the US. Data on unit labour costs were collected from the statistics 
database of the OECD. The relative skilled labour is proxied by the ratio of the 
secondary gross enrolment rate of the host country to that of the US in this 
study. Data on the secondary gross enrolment ratio of the US and recipients 
were collected from the WDI. The openness of the host country is measured by 
the ratio of exports to gross domestic product. Data on openness were obtained 
from the WDI. 
We use the standard deviation of the real exchange rate as a proxy for the 
extent of exchange rate fluctuations. Data on the nominal exchange rate of the 
recipient country’s currency against the US dollar were collected from the IFS, 
and then converted into a real exchange rate using GDP deflators. For Euro-
area countries, exchange rates before 1999 were calculated based on the 
conversion rate between the Euro in 1999 and the country’s currency. For 
example, for France, the exchange rate of the Euro against the US dollar in, 
say, 1990 is calculated by the 1990 Franc/USD exchange rate divided by the 
fixed conversion rate of Francs to Euros in 1999.  
To find a proxy to measure trade costs is a challenge for the research. In the 
literature, some studies use the distance between the investing country and the 
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host country whereas some others use freight rates as proxies for trade costs. 
However, the distance between the investing country and the host country does 
not vary over time4 while freight rates are only a component of trade costs. 
Several other studies use the CIF/FOB ratio reported in the Direction of Trade 
Statistics of the IMF as a proxy for transport costs (for example, Limao and 
Venables, 2001; UNCTAD, 2006). This ratio gives the value of imports 
including costs, insurance and freight (CIF) relative to their free on board 
(FOB) value. However, Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and Jacks, Meissner 
and Novy (2006) indicate that trade costs includes not only transport costs but 
also costs relevant to tariff5 and non-tariff barriers.6 To address the challenge, 
we construct a measure of trade costs7 between the US and countries in the 
sample based on the recent works by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008) to 
control for the effect of trade costs in the regression models.8 
With respect to political risks, this research constructs an index as the sum of 
ratings of the investment profile, corruption, and law and order provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). In the ICRG, the rating of 
investment profile of a country is scaled from 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very 
low risk), the rating of corruption from 0 (very high risk) to 6 (very low risk), 
                                                 
4
 Therefore, the use of distance as a proxy for trade costs seems to be only applicable in cross-
sectional data studies. 
5
 Some cross-sectional data studies, for example Brainard (1997), use freight rates and tariffs 
to control for the effect of trade costs in the regression model. However, data on freight rates 
and tariffs are limited, especially for panel samples (of countries) with large N and T. 
6
 This leads to a difficulty in measuring trade costs by direct methods due to the limitation of 
data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers (for example, see Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). 
7
 In their works, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006, 2008) present a micro-founded measure of 
trade costs, which is capable of measuring transport costs, tariffs, and all other macroeconomic 
friction that impede international trade costs. In this research, we construct trade costs 
(between the US and the countries in the sample) as expression (3) in Jacks, Meissner and 
Novy (2008). The constructed data are available on request. 
8
 This study also uses the CIF/FOB ratio as an alternative. However, the measure of trade costs 
constructed based on Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006, 2008) is the preferred in this study.  
The regressions using CIF/FOB ratio as a proxy for trade costs are presented in appendices. 
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and the rating of law and order from 0 (very high risk) to 6 (very low risk). We 
give equal weights to the investment profile, corruption, and law and order in 
the index by converting their ICRG ratings into a scale from 0 (very high risk) 
to 10 (very low risk) before taking the sum. This leads to an index ranging 
from 0 (very high risk) to 30 (very low risk). This index is used as a proxy of 
risks relevant to FDI decisions. 
It is worth noting that some of the literature analyses additional (locational) 
variables that are not included in the model (3). These could be cultural 
differences, geographic distance and language differences between the host 
country and the investing country, all of which may affect FDI. These long-
term factors are likely to be constant or approximately constant over time and 
will be treated as time-invariant, country-specific (fixed) effects in the 
empirical analysis. 
This study uses a sample comprising twenty one developed OCED countries 
covering the period from 1982 to 2010. The countries are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In some cases in the sample 
where data are missing, missing data were interpolated based on available data. 
III.2. Empirical methods 
Before discussing estimation methods, this study discusses three distinct unit 
root tests that will be applied in the empirical analysis to check for stationarity. 
This is necessary because the time-series dimension, T, of the sample used in 
this research is fairly large. The problem with thin and long panel data sets is 
that regression results may be spurious when variables are non-stationary. 
Therefore, as a first step, variables need to be tested for stationarity and, should 
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they be non-stationary, the relationship between them needs to be tested for 
cointegration. Only when there is cointegration can inferences reliably be 
made. Otherwise, the results may be spurious. 
There are various panel unit-root tests in the econometric literature, of which 
the LLC test proposed by Levin and Lin (1992) and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
is a popular one (Baltagi, 2008). The null hypothesis in this test is that all 
panels have a homogeneous unit root versus the alternative hypothesis that all 
panels are stationary. In comparison with other homogeneous panel unit-root 
tests such as the one by Harris and Tzavalis (1999), the LLC test is likely to be 
more appropriate for this research because it requires the time-series dimension 
of the dataset to be larger than the cross-section dimension.  
The potential disadvantage of the LLC test is that it restricts all autoregressive 
coefficients to be homogeneous across all panels. This assumption may be too 
strong. Maddala and Wu (1999) propose a panel unit-root test (henceforth the 
M-W test) that allows the autoregressive coefficients to vary across panels. In 
particular, this test combines the significance levels of individual Phillips-
Perron or ADF unit-root tests for each cross-section i to construct an overall 
test statistic based on a test suggested by Fisher (1932): 
9 = −2∑ lnφ=>?/                                               (4) 
where φ is the p-value of a unit root test for country i. 
This is used to test the null hypothesis that all panels have a unit root versus 
the alternative hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary. Since −2 lnφ 
is distributed as @1 with two degrees of freedom, 9 has a @1	 distribution with 
2N degrees of freedom where N denotes the number of panels. 
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Note that both the LLC and M-W tests are based on the potentially restrictive 
assumption that individual time series in the panel are cross-sectionally 
independent. Pesaran (2007) suggests a test that relaxes this assumption 
(henceforth the CIPS test) which controls for the possible presence of cross-
section dependence. The null hypothesis in this test is that all panels (here, 
countries) have a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that a fraction of 
panels are stationary. In particular, the method of this test is based on 
augmenting the usual ADF regression with the cross-section averages of 
lagged levels and first-differences of the individual series to capture cross-
sectional dependence. Pesaran calls this a cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-
Fuller (CADF) test. The simple CADF regression is: 
∆B>C = D> + E>B>,CF/ + GHBC̅F/ + G/∆BC̅ + J>C																									5 
where BC̅ is the cross-section average of BC at time t. The presence of the lagged 
cross-section average and its first-difference can account for cross-section 
dependence. In the case that there is serial correlation in the errors, the 
regression is additionally augmented with the lagged first-differences of both 
B>C and BC̅ to control for serial correlation, which leads to 
∆B>C = D> + E>B>,CF/ + GHBC̅F/ +LGMN/∆BC̅FM
O
M?H
+LPQ∆B>,CFQ
O
Q?/
+ J>C					6 
After performing the CADF regression for each cross section, the CIPS test 
averages the t-ratio of the lagged value (henceforth STUV>) to construct the 
CIPS-statistic as follows: 
SWXY − statistic = 1\LSTUV>
=
>?/
																																			7 
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Pesaran (2007) also shows that the CIPS panel unit-root test has satisfactory 
size and power even for relatively small values of the cross-section dimension 
N and time-series dimension T. Along with the LLC and M-W tests, the CIPS 
test is used to check for unit roots in the variables used in this study. Since the 
data on each variable used are yearly (not daily or monthly) and the time series 
dimension, T, is not very large, the maximum lag length is chosen to be three. 
Among the three unit-root tests, the CIPS approach is preferred because it 
allows for the heterogeneity of autoregressive coefficients across panels and 
can address cross-sectional dependence. 
Next, we turn to the discussion of the estimation methods. In this section, 
estimation methods are discussed that address major potential problems of this 
study. Firstly, the panel data set has a reasonably long time dimension and thus 
non-stationarity of the variables in the model needs to be addressed. In 
addition, since this is a macroeconomic panel data study on FDI, where many 
of the determinants (as discussed in the literature review) cannot be included 
due to data availability, these effects need to be controlled for to avoid omitted 
variable bias. Also, we discuss methods to allow the effects of explanatory 
variables and unobserved common factors to vary across countries to fulfil the 
aims of this study. 
Consider a form of an FDI model as follows: 
^_` = a_′c_` + J_`																																																				8 
where y is the dependent variable, x is a vector of observed explanatory 
variables and a are the slope parameters for the elements of x. In this study, the 
explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous. 
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In order to account for common factors such as a global financial crisis, this 
study introduces unobserved common factors (eC) into the model (8). In the 
context of investigation of FDI from the US to a cross-section of OECD 
countries, eC is also assumed to include the (average) ownership advantages of 
US firms such as advantages in technology, innovation or superior managerial 
skills which may affect US FDI to a cross section of OECD countries. The 
model is: 
^_` = a_′c_` + f_′e` + J_`																																																		9 
where eC is assumed to be one or more latent factors capturing the effect of 
unobserved common factors, and f> are the factor loadings which may vary 
across countries.  
The formulation in (9) is sometimes called an interactive fixed effects 
specification, and it generalizes conventional country-specific (fixed) effects 
and conventional time dummies (e.g. if one of the eC factors is constant over 
time, that yields a set of country-specific effects; and if one of the factors has 
the same coefficients, that yields time effects, given that the time path of eC is 
not restricted). Therefore, model (9) can control for country-specific effects 
(e.g. cultural differences, geographic distances) and conventional time 
dummies, but is more general than either. 
Now we discuss the estimation of model (9) by using different estimators. 
Firstly, it can be seen that the Pooled OLS (POLS) estimator uses a 
conventional least squares regression based on pooling all the observations 
without considering country-specific effects, which could lead to biased 
estimates. In addition, in the POLS estimates, the effects of the explanatory 
variables (x) are restricted to be constant across countries (a> = a. 
Unobserved common factors (eC) might be taken into account by introducing 
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time dummies into the POLS regression model. However, the time dummies 
can only capture common shocks to FDI that have the same effects across 
countries, and thus the effects of eC on FDI are constrained to be homogeneous 
across countries (f> = f in the POLS estimates. 
In the Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) estimators, time-invariant 
country-specific effects are taken into account and treated as fixed and random 
in the regression respectively. To decide between the FE and the RE estimator, 
we can run a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred 
model is RE versus the alternative being FE. However, in the FE and RE 
estimators, the slope parameters of x are constrained to be identical across 
countries (a> = a. In addition, as in Pooled OLS estimation, eC may be taken 
into account by including time dummies in the FE and RE regression models, 
and thus the influence of 	eC on FDI is restricted to be constant across 
countries f> = f by both the FE and RE estimators.  
Apart from the POLS, FE and RE estimators, the more recent Mean Group 
(MG) estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), relaxes the 
assumption of homogeneity of explanatory variables’ parameters. The MG 
estimator allows the effects of explanatory variables to vary across countries 
by firstly estimating country-specific OLS regression models and then 
averaging the estimated parameters across countries to obtain an average 
effect. In addition, this estimation can capture country-specific effects as an 
intercept in each of the individual regression models (one per country). 
Unobserved common shocks (eC may be controlled for by introducing a time 
trend in the regression model for each country, and thus the effect of eC is 
allowed to vary across countries (Eberhardt and Bond, 2009; Eberhardt, 2011). 
However, the use of the country-specific time trend will restrict the unobserved 
common factors to be (smoothly) increasing or decreasing over time. Note that 
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we cannot use a full set of time dummies (as in the POLS and FE estimators) 
in the regression model for each country because they would explain the 
dependent variable perfectly.  
Recent work by Pesaran (2006), extended to non-stationary variables by 
Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata (2011), suggests the use of Common 
Correlated Effects (CCE) estimators with cross-section averages of the 
dependent variable  h^C and independent variables c̅C to account for the 
presence of unobserved common factors (eC) with heterogeneous effects 
(Pesaran, 2006; Coakley, Fuertes and Smith, 2006; Kapetanios, Pesaran and 
Yamagata, 2011; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011); then the model (9) becomes 
^_` = a_′c_` + P_i^` + j_′ci` + J_`																																				10 
In CCE estimates, the estimated country-specific parameters on h^C and c̅C are 
not interpretable in a conventional way: their presence is only to control for the 
biasing effects of the unobserved common factors. There are two alternative 
methods to estimate model (10), namely the Common Correlated Effects 
Pooled (CCEP) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) 
estimators. Pesaran (2006), Stock and Watson (2008), Kapetanios, Pesaran and 
Yamagata (2011) and Pesaran and Tosetti (2011) show that the CCE estimators 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and to the presence of 
structural breaks. The CCEP estimator is a fixed effects regression where each 
country has a separate parameter for each of the cross-section averages. 
Therefore, the CCEP allows unobserved common factors to have 
heterogeneous effects across countries. However, in CCEP estimation, the 
parameters of the main explanatory variables (here, the x’s) are restricted to be 
identical across countries (a> = a. Alternatively, we can relax the restriction 
of the homogeneity of the slope parameters by using a CCEMG estimator. The 
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CCEMG estimator, which is based on an MG estimation of model (10), can 
permit the observed explanatory variables’ parameters to be varying across 
countries. As with CCEP, it also allows the unobserved common factors to 
have different effects on different countries.  
It is worth noting that if variables are non-stationary, regression results could 
be spurious. However, this is not the case when the variables are cointegrated. 
Normally, when variables are non-stationary, their linear combination is also 
non-stationary which undermines inference and leads to spurious regression 
results. However, non-stationary variables may move together over time even 
though individually they are random walks. In other words, cointegration is a 
specific result which may occur in the presence of variables with unit roots. As 
a result of cointegration, the error term is stationary. An empirical indicator of 
cointegration is when a regression produces stationary residuals. As discussed, 
the current study accounts for unobserved common factors in the estimation, 
and thus they could be a part of a cointegrating vector. Since the way to control 
for unobservable common factors varies across estimators, this study will first 
estimate the model with the inclusion of unobserved common factors, and then 
check for the stationarity of the residuals. If observed explanatory variables 
(and unobserved common factors) are cointegrated, we can establish a long-run 
economic relationship between the variables which can be interpreted in 
relation to the economic theories of FDI presented in the literature review 
above. 
Another problem is that the observed explanatory variables and unobserved 
common factors may have effects on US FDI to recipient countries to different 
degrees. The restrictions that those effects are homogeneous across countries 
may cause cross-section dependence among regression errors, leading to 
biased estimates, especially in a panel data analysis with long T. Therefore, this 
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study will check the cross-section independence of the residuals by using a 
cross-section dependence (CD) test suggested by Pesaran (2004). In this study, 
we use the unit-root and CD tests to choose the preferred empirical model. 
In summary, this section provided a discussion of the model, data sources and 
empirical methods used in this study to investigate the influence of the host 
country factors on FDI from the United States (US) to developed OECD 
countries in the period 1982-2010. The empirical results will be presented in 
the next section. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the empirical results of the research. In order to check the 
stationarity of the variables, this study plots variables and their first differences 
over time (see appendix 2 and appendix 3). This is because the appropriate 
critical values of the unit root test statistics depend on the deterministic terms 
that are included. If the unit root test does not specify the deterministic terms 
correctly, then this may lead to an over- or under-rejection of the null 
hypothesis. A straightforward way to decide on what deterministic terms 
should be included in the unit root test is to look at the graphs of the individual 
series.     
The graphs in appendix 2 show that the variables of foreign direct investment, 
ln FDI, market size, ln GDP, relative tax rates, ln TAX, relative skilled labour, 
ln SKILL, openness, ln OPEN, transport costs, ln TC, and political risks, 
ln RISK, are likely to be trended while the variables relative labour costs, 
ln COST, and fluctuations of the exchange rate, ln FER, are not likely to be 
trended. Therefore, this study adopts LLC, M-W and CIPS unit-root tests with 
a trend for the former and adopts those with a constant only for the latter. The 
p-values of the unit-root tests of all variables are reported in Table IV.1. We 
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can see from Table IV.1 that the results of the LLC test reject the null 
hypothesis that variables ln FDI and ln RISK have a unit root while those of the 
M-W and CIPS tests do not reject the null hypothesis.  
With respect to the variables ln TAX, ln COST, ln OPEN and ln TC, the results 
of the LLC and M-W tests reject that these variables are non-stationary at 
conventional levels of significance. However the use of the CIPS test does not 
reject the null hypothesis that they are non-stationary. Table IV.1 also shows 
that all three tests reject a unit root for the variable ln FER but they do not 
reject for variables ln GDP and ln SKILL. Among the three unit-root tests, the 
results of the CIPS are preferred because this test allows for the heterogeneity 
of autoregressive coefficients across panels and can control for cross-sectional 
dependence. Therefore, it can be seen that, apart from the variable ln FER, the 
other variables in the model are likely to be non-stationary. 
Table IV.1 here 
Variables that are integrated of order one can be made stationary by taking first 
differences. Since the more reliable CIPS test suggests that all the variables 
except for fluctuations of the exchange rate, ln FER, may be non-stationary, 
the second step of the testing procedure is to find out whether the first 
differences are stationary. If this is the case, then the variables are integrated of 
order one, conventionally denoted as I(1). Since unit root tests above indicate 
that ln FER is stationary, there is no need to test the first difference of ln FER 
for stationarity.  
Table IV.2 here 
The graphs in appendix 3 show that all the first differences of variables seem 
to be un-trended, and thus this study runs the tests with no trend for the first 
differences of variables. We can see that all the results of LLC, M-W and CIPS 
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tests in Table IV.2 reject that the first-differences of the variables have a unit 
root at the one or five percent levels of significance, indicating that the first-
differences of the variables are stationary. Therefore, from the results in Tables 
IV.1 and IV.2, it is likely that the variable for exchange-rate fluctuations, 
ln FER, seems to be stationary while the others in the model are potentially 
I(1).  
Next, estimates of the model for FDI are reported. All the models assume that 
the explanatory variables are exogenous. This may be too strong an 
assumption. For instance, GDP is likely to be endogenous in a model that 
explains FDI. The consequence of including endogenous variables in the 
model will be biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. However, as 
discussed in section 3, the use of lagged values of the explanatory variables as 
instruments (for the current values) in the model could help to reduce this 
potential problem. This study, in turn, experimented with one- and two-year 
lags as instruments.9 The POLS, FE, MG, CCEP and CCEMG results from the 
model using one-year lagged values for the explanatory variables are reported 
in Table IV.3 while those from the model using two-year lagged values are 
reported in Table IV.4.  
The choices of the lag length and the estimation method have a strong impact 
on the estimation results. Turning to the results with the one-year lagged values 
depicted in Table IV.3 first, none of the variables are significant across all 
estimates. There is some indication that market size, relative tax rates, relative 
labour costs, openness and the volatility of the exchange rate may be 
determinants of FDI. The results vary depending on the estimation method 
used. Turning to Table IV.4, there is evidence that relative tax rates, relative 
labour costs, relative skilled labour, openness and political risks are associated 
                                                 
9
 See pp.16-17 in section III for a discussion of the choice of the lag. 
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with FDI. Again, the significance of the estimated coefficients on these 
variables seems to vary. However, the influence of market size and the 
fluctuations of the exchange rate on FDI are found to be significant when using 
most of the estimators. 
Table IV.3 and table IV.4 here 
In order to discriminate between the one and two-year lagged models, this 
study compares the root mean square error (RMSE) of the two models. Except 
for POLS, the RMSE of all other regressions for the model with two-year lags 
is smaller than that of the model with one-year lags. Thus, the fit of the model 
is better in the two-year lagged form. The result suggests FDI may be best 
explained by two-year lagged information rather than one-year lagged 
information. The section below concentrates on discussing estimation results 
for the models using two-year lagged values of the explanatory variables in 
Table IV.4. 
In POLS estimation with assumptions on the homogeneity of slope parameters 
and factor loadings for unobserved common factors, the coefficients on the 
variables of market size, ln GDPF1, the relative tax rates, ln TAXF1, the 
relative labour costs, ln COSTF1, the host country’s openness, ln OPENF1, 
and trade costs, ln TCF1	 are significant; the elasticities are 1.45, -0.72, -1.98, 
1.67 and -0.54 respectively. This result implies a one-percent increase in the 
market size and openness of the host country, on average, increases the level of 
the US FDI stock in the host country by 1.01 and 1.67 per cent, respectively, 
while a one-percent increase in relative tax rate, relative labour costs and trade 
costs, on average, decreases the level of the US FDI stock in the host country 
by 0.72, 1.98 and 0.54 percent, respectively. Other variables - the relative 
skilled labour, ln SKILLF1, the fluctuations of the exchange rate ln FERF1, 
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and the host country’s political risks, ln RISKF1, are found to be insignificant 
in the OLS estimation. Note that the POLS estimator does not control for 
unobserved country-specific effects, for example, cultural differences or 
geographic distance between the investing country and host countries, which 
may influence US FDI to the host country. In addition, the results of the CIPS, 
M-W and LLC tests (see Table IV.5) show that the residuals estimated by 
POLS may contain a unit root. The implication is that the variables are not 
cointegrated and that the regression may be spurious.  A further point is that 
the result of Pesaran (2004)’s cross-section dependence (CD) test (see Table 
IV.6) indicates that the POLS residuals are cross-sectionally dependent. 
Therefore, the POLS estimation results are likely to be biased. 
In order to control for country-specific effects, we can use FE and RE 
estimators where country-specific effects are taken into account and treated as 
fixed and random parameters in the regression respectively. To decide between 
the FE and the RE estimator, this study runs a Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is that the preferred model is RE versus the alternative being FE. 
The result of the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis at the one percent 
level of significance, implying that the FE model should be preferred over the 
RE model.  
The results of FE estimation in Table IV.4 show that the coefficients on 
variables for the host country’s market size, ln GDPF1, the host country’s 
openness, ln OPENF1, and the variability of the exchange rate, ln FERF1, are 
significant and the elasticities are approximately 2.29, 1.44 and -0.05 
respectively. These results imply that a one percent increase in the host 
country’s market size and openness, on average, increases the level of the US 
FDI stock in the host country by 2.29 and 1.44 percent respectively while a one 
percent increase in fluctuations of the exchange rate, on average, decreases the 
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level of the US FDI stock in the host country by 0.05 per cent. The coefficients 
on the other variables including relative tax rates, ln TAXF1,	relative labour 
costs, ln COSTF1,	 relative skilled labour,		ln SKILLF1,	 trade costs, ln TCF1, 
and political risks, ln RISKF1, are found to be insignificant. However, similar 
to the POLS estimation, the result of the CIPS test (see Table IV.5) does not 
reject the hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the FE residuals at 
conventional levels, implying that the FE regression may be spurious. In 
addition, the residuals estimated from the FE estimator are found to be cross-
sectionally dependent on the basis of Pesaran’s CD test (see Table IV.6). Thus, 
the FE coefficients are likely to be biased. 
In the MG estimation which allows the effects of the observed explanatory 
variables to vary across countries, the coefficients on the variables for market 
size, ln GDPF1, is significant at the one percent level with values 1.48 whereas 
those on the variables for relative labour costs, ln COSTF1 and the fluctuations 
of the exchange rate, ln FERF1 are approximately -0.42 and -0.03, and are 
significant at the one and five percent level respectively. In contrast to the 
results in the POLS and FE estimates, the coefficient on the variable for the 
host country’s political risks, ln RISKF1, in the MG estimates is found to be 
significant at the ten percent level and approximately 0.57. These results imply 
that a one percent increase in the market size and the risk index of the host 
country, on average, increases the US FDI stock by 1.48 and 0.57 percent 
respectively, while a one percent increase in relative labour costs and the 
fluctuations of the exchange rate, on average, decreases the FDI stock by 0.42 
and 0.03 percent respectively. Other variables, including relative tax rates, 
ln TAXF1,	relative skilled labour, ln SKILLF1,	 the host country’s openness, 
ln OPENF1 	and	 trade costs, ln TCF1, are found to have an insignificant effect 
on US FDI stock to the host country. Unlike the POLS and FE cases, all three 
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unit-root tests suggest that the MG residuals are likely to be stationary (see 
Table IV.5). This implies that there exists a cointegrating long-run relationship 
between the variables in the model. The CD test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of the absence of cross-section dependence in the MG residuals (see 
Table IV.6). However, the p-value in the CD test is just 0.20, and thus the 
absence of cross-section dependence in the MG residuals seems not to be 
safely confirmed. Note that, in the MG estimation, unobserved common factors 
are controlled for by introducing a time trend in the regression model for each 
country, and thus the effect of unobserved common factors is allowed to vary 
across country. However, the use of the country-specific time trend restricts the 
unobserved common factors to be (smoothly) increasing or decreasing over 
time. 
Table IV.5 here 
Next, this study uses the CCEP estimator in which the effects of unobserved 
common factors are permitted to be heterogeneous although the parameters of 
the explanatory variables are constrained to be identical across countries (as in 
POLS, RE and FE, but not MG). In the CCEP estimates, the variables for 
relative labour costs, ln COSTF1, trade costs, ln TCF1, and the political risks 
of the host country, ln RISKF1, are found to be insignificant while the 
variables for relative tax rates, ln TAXF1, the host country’s openness, 
ln OPENF1, and the exchange-rate variability, ln FERF1, are significant with 
their coefficients being approximately -0.46, 0.57 and -0.02 respectively. The 
variables for the host-country market size, ln GDPF1, and relative skilled 
labour, ln SKILLF1, are found to be significant at the ten percent level with 
their coefficients being roughly 0.72 and 0.50. The results indicate that a one 
percent increase in the relative tax rate and the fluctuation of the exchange rate, 
on average, reduces the US FDI stock by 0.46 and 0.02 per cent respectively, 
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whereas a one-percent increase in the host country’s market size, relative 
skilled labour and the host country’s openness, on average, raises the US FDI 
stock by 0.72, 0.50 and 0.57 per cent respectively. Like the MG estimation, the 
results of LLC, M-W and CIPS unit-root tests indicate that the residuals 
estimated from the CCEP estimation are potentially stationary. However, the 
result of the CD test rejects the null hypothesis, implying that the CCEP 
residuals are potentially cross-sectionally dependent. Therefore, it is likely that 
the CCEP results could also be biased. 
Table IV.6 here 
This study continues to attempt to improve on the estimation approach by 
using the recently-developed CCEMG estimator, which allows the effects of 
the observed explanatory variables and the factor loadings on unobserved 
common factors to vary across individual countries. The CCEMG regression 
shows that the coefficients on the variables of the host country’s market size, 
ln GDPF1, and relative tax rates, ln TAXF1, are found to be significant at the 
five percent level, with values approximately 1.47 and -0.50 respectively, 
whereas that on the host country’s political risks, ln RISKF1, is found to be 
significant at the ten percent level with a value of 0.68. These estimation 
results imply that a one percent increase in the market size and the risk index 
of the host country will, on average, increase the level of the US FDI stock in 
the host country by 1.47 and 0.68 per cent respectively, while a one percent 
increase in the relative tax rates between the host country and the US will, on 
average, decrease the level of the US FDI stock in the host country by 0.50 per 
cent. Other explanatory variables including relative labour costs, relative 
skilled labour, the host country’s openness, the fluctuations of the exchange 
rate and trade costs are found to have insignificant effects on the level of the 
US FDI stock in the host country in the CCEMG estimation. In addition, this 
36 
 
study runs an F-test to test the joint significance of cross-section averages of 
variables which are used to capture the heterogeneous effects of unobserved 
common factors in the CCEMG estimator. The result of the F-test shows that 
the cross-section averages are jointly significant at the one percent level. 
The results of the LLC, M-W and CIPS unit-root tests (see Table IV.5) indicate 
that the estimated residuals from the CCEMG estimation are potentially 
stationary. This means that variables (including unobserved common factors) 
are likely to be cointegrated, implying the existence of a long-run relationship 
in the data. In addition, the result of the CD test does not reject the null 
hypothesis with the p-value being 0.88 (see Table IV.6), implying that the 
hypothesis that the CCEMG residuals are cross-sectionally independent is not 
rejected at conventional levels. These results indicate that the CCEMG 
estimation is to be preferred to the previous ones, because the POLS, FE and 
CCEP residuals may be non-stationary and/or cross-sectionally dependent. 
Although CD tests do not reject the presence of cross-sectional dependence in 
the residuals estimated  from the CCEMG and MG estimators, the p-value of 
the CD test for the CCEMG residuals (equal to 0.88) is much larger than that 
of the MG (equal to 0.20). Moreover, the RMSE of the CCEMG estimator is 
found to be smaller than that of the MG estimator, implying that the fit of the 
model estimated by CCEMG is better than that of the model fitted by the MG 
estimator. Therefore, the CCEMG estimator is preferred in this research.  
When using CIF/FOB ratio as an alternative measure of trade costs in the 
regressions, the empirical results are similar (see appendix 4). Data also 
support the empirical specification allowing for heterogeneity of slope 
coefficients on the observed variables and the heterogeneity of the factor 
loadings on the unobserved common factors in the CCEMG estimation rather 
than other ones. The CCEMG regression (see column 5 in appendix 4) 
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indicates the effects of the host country’s market size and political risks to be 
positive and significant at the five percent level while the effect of relative 
labour costs, relative skilled labour, the host country’s openness and trades 
costs to be found to be insignificant. These results are similar to those in the 
CCEMG estimation using a measure of trade costs based on Jacks, Meissner 
and Novy (2006, 2008) above. However, unlike the results of the CCEMG 
using a measure of trade costs based on Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006, 
2008), the impact of the relative tax rates is found to be insignificant while the 
impact of exchange-rate fluctuations is found to be negative and significant at 
the ten percent level in the CCEMG estimation using CIF/FOB ratio as a proxy 
for trade costs. A negative and (weakly) significant effect of exchange-rate 
fluctuations on FDI seem to support the theory of currency area, in that a host 
country with large fluctuations of the exchange rate deters inward FDI because 
investors may worry that those large fluctuations can lead to instability in the 
economic environment in that country. In the two CCEMG using different 
measures of trade cost (see columns 5 in Table IV.4 and appendix 4), it can be 
seen that the coefficient on the host country’s market size and political risks 
are found to be positive and significant, implying that the effects of the host 
country’s market size and political risks on the level of US FDI stock are 
robust; whereas the coefficient on trade costs is found to be insignificant in the 
two CCEMG estimations, indicating that trade costs between the US and the 
host country seem not to significantly impact the level of US FDI stock in the 
host country. It is noteworthy that in this research the regressions using a 
measure of trade costs constructed based on Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006, 
2008) is preferred than those using CIF/FOB ratio as a proxy for trade costs.10  
                                                 
10
 See the discussion in pp.18-19 in section III. 
38 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study has used aggregate macro-panel data to investigate empirically the 
effects of market size, relative tax rates, relative labour costs, relative skilled 
labour, openness, fluctuations of the exchange rate, trade costs and political 
risks on US foreign direct investment to OECD countries in the period 1982-
2010. In the study, we experimented with two groups of models, of which the 
first group consists of models using one-year lagged values of the explanatory 
variables and the second consists of models using two-year lagged values of 
the explanatory variables. This is because the explanatory variables are argued 
to react to FDI with a lag of one or two years. In addition, the use of lagged 
values could help to reduce the problem of a simultaneous effect of FDI on 
these variables. Empirical results in this study suggest using the models with 
two-year lags for explanatory variables, and thus the conclusion below is based 
on the estimation results from these models. 
The empirical findings seem to reject the inferences from the POLS, FE and 
CCEP estimators because the estimated residuals achieved from these 
estimations are found to be cross-sectionally dependent and/or possibly non-
stationary. It is possible that the cross-section dependence and/or non-
stationarity of the residuals are potentially caused by the restrictions of the 
homogeneity of the slope coefficients on the observed explanatory variables, 
and the homogeneity of the factor loadings on the unobserved common factors. 
Unlike the POLS, FE and CCEP residuals, the MG and CCEMG residuals are 
found to be stationary and do not show serious evidence of cross-section 
dependence. In the MG estimation, which allows for the heterogeneity of the 
slope parameters on the observed explanatory variables, the market size of the 
host country was found to have a significant effect on US FDI stock to the host 
country in the period 1982-2010, and relative labour costs, fluctuations of the 
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exchange rate and the host country’s political risks were also found to have 
significant effects on the US FDI stock. Although the CD test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of the absence of cross-section dependence in the MG 
residuals at conventional levels, the p-value in the CD test is 0.20; and thus the 
absence of cross-section dependence in the MG residuals seems not to be 
safely confirmed.11 Note that in the MG estimation, unobserved common 
factors are controlled for by introducing country-specific time trends, and thus 
the factor loadings on unobserved common factors are allowed to vary across 
countries. However, the use of the country-specific time trend restricts the 
unobserved common factors to be (smoothly) increasing or decreasing over 
time.  
In the CCEMG estimation, which allows for the heterogeneity of the slope 
parameters on the observed explanatory variables and in the factor loadings on 
the unobserved common factors, in order to fulfil the research aims set out in 
the introduction, the host country’s market size and a political risk index of the 
host country were found to have significant effects on US FDI stock to the host 
country in the period 1982-2010. These results are likely to be similar to those 
of the MG estimation. However, in the CCEMG estimation, relative labour 
costs were found to have an insignificant impact on the FDI stock while 
relative tax rates between the host country and the US were found to have a 
negative and significant effect on the US FDI stock. The result differs from 
MG estimation where the relative labour costs were found to be significant. 
The influences of other variables, including relative tax rates, relative skilled 
labour, the host country’s openness and transport costs on the US FDI stock 
were also found to be insignificant in the CCEMG estimation. In addition, the 
                                                 
11
 With respect to the MG estimation using the ratio CIF/FOB as a measure of trade costs, the 
p-value in the CD test of the residuals calculated from the MG estimation is just 0.12 (see 
column 3 in appendix 4). 
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result of the F-test rejects the exclusion of the cross-section averages of 
variables which are used to capture the unobserved common factors with 
heterogeneous impacts on FDI from the CCEMG regression. Unlike the POLS, 
FE and CCEP cases, the inference from the CCEMG estimates should not be 
rejected because its estimated residuals were found to be stationary and cross-
sectionally independent. Moreover, the inference from the CCEMG estimator 
is likely to be preferred over that of the MG because the p-value of the CD test 
for CCEMG residuals is larger than that for the MG residuals and additionally 
the fit of the CCEMG model was found to be better than that of MG.  
In brief, the empirical results from the preferred CCEMG estimates indicate 
that US FDI seems to be attracted to host countries with a large market size, 
low relative tax rate and little risk in the investment climate, corruption or the 
legal environment. The CCEMG regression can allow for common shocks, for 
example the global financial crisis, and/or average ownership-specific 
advantages of US firms such as advanced technology or superior managerial 
systems that could affect FDI from the US to OECD countries. This could be 
reasonable because US firms are known as leading firms in innovation, 
knowledge and ways to efficiently operate. The significance of the variable for 
political risks may also reinforce this, because the FDI motivated by these 
factors may tend to attach importance to the host countries which have high 
transparency and efficiency in the investment and business environment, and 
are known for the impartiality of the legal system and the observance of the 
law (e.g. commercial dispute regulations, assets and property or intellectual 
property laws).  
In terms of theory, the evidence that the host country’s market size, relative tax 
rates and the host country’s risks of investment climate, corruption and legal 
environment have significant effects on FDI in this study supports the 
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perspective of locational factors in the eclectic theory. On the other hand, 
although trade costs are found to be insignificant, the finding of the 
significance of the host country’s market size for FDI is likely to support the 
theory of horizontal FDI to some extent. Variable of exchange-rate fluctuations 
is insignificant in the preferred estimation in this research, but it is found to be 
significant and negative in the estimation using CIF/FOB ratio as a measure of 
trade costs. The finding of the negative effect of exchange-rate fluctuations on 
FDI may support the theory of currency area, in that a host country with large 
fluctuations of the exchange rate discourages inward FDI because investors 
may worry that those large fluctuations can lead to uncertainty or instability in 
the economic environment in that country. Vertical FDI theory and Kojima’s 
theory seem not to be supported, because of the finding of insignificance for 
relative labour costs and relative skilled labour variables. 
It is worth noting that the significance of the host country’s market size is 
robustly positive throughout all estimators (including the POLS, FE, MG, 
CCEP and CCEMG) while that of relative tax rates is robustly negative in all 
estimators, excepting the FE and MG. Conversely, the effect of trade costs on 
the US FDI stock is robustly insignificant in all estimators, excepting the 
POLS. 
This study makes the following contributions to the panel literature on 
determinants driving FDI from a country to a cross-section of host countries. 
Firstly, the empirical literature tends to apply standard panel data estimators 
that constrain the observed explanatory variables’ parameters to be 
homogeneous across recipients. This assumption can be too strong, because the 
influence of a factor on FDI may be heterogeneous for different countries. In 
this research, the data seem to reject empirical specifications which impose 
homogeneity of the slope parameters. 
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Secondly, the empirical results in this study show that the exclusion of 
unobserved common factors, or a constraint of the homogeneity of the factor 
loadings for the unobserved common factors, may potentially produce serious 
biases in the findings. It is noteworthy that, in the context of the investigation 
on FDI from an investing country to a cross-section of host countries, besides 
global shocks, common factors could include the time-varying average 
advanced knowledge, technology or innovation of the investing country’s 
firms. Those factors seem to be likely to be relevant to 
ownership/internalization advantages that may influence FDI, as suggested in 
Hymer (1976), Kindleberger (1969), Buckley and Casson (1976) and Dunning 
(1977, 1981). Therefore, they should be carefully addressed in the estimation. 
This study adopted a new approach to address these two issues of the previous 
literature by employing the recent CCEMG estimator, in order to take 
unobserved common factors into account and permit heterogeneous effects of 
both observed variables and the unobserved common factors across recipients 
in the empirical estimation. The empirical results seem to support this 
approach rather than more standard ones and thereby indicate that this 
approach should be considered for future empirical analyses of the 
determinants of FDI.  
In addition, this study used CIF/FOB ratio and a measure based on recent work 
by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2006, 2008) to control for the effect of trade 
costs in regressions. We find little support for the view that trade costs is an 
important determinant of US FDI stock. 
This study has the following limitations. Firstly, it does not deal with dynamics 
in detail. This is because the theoretical CCEMG set-up in Pesaran (2006) and 
Kapetanios, Pesaran and Yamagata (2011) does not allow for dynamics in the 
model. The CCEMG estimator was chosen because it allows for the 
43 
 
heterogeneity of observed variables and unobserved common factors across 
countries. Standard dynamic panel estimators such as Anderson-Hsiao, 
Arellano-Bond12 or dynamic FE do not allow for the heterogeneity of the 
effects of the observed variables and unobserved common factors across 
countries. A second limitation is that the assumption of the exogeneity of 
regressors in CCEMG could be too strong. The use of two-year lagged values 
for independent variables in this study may help to reduce the effect of the 
dependent variables on independent variables to some extent; however, this 
may not avoid the problem completely. There is a recent working paper by 
Chudik and Pesaran (2013) which extends the CCEMG estimator to weakly 
exogenous regressors and allows for dynamics in the model. However, the 
theoretical results of the CCEMG in that paper are currently only for the case 
when the dependent variable and regressors are stationary. In our case, since 
the dependent variable and most regressors appear to be I(1), the existing 
results are not applicable, and otherwise the theoretical properties of the 
CCEMG estimator applied to dynamic models are not yet known. Future 
progress in this area will help to ensure that empirical work on the 
determinants of FDI will be increasingly informative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Also, the Anderson-Hsiao and Arellano-Bond estimators are intended for short-T panels and 
may be inappropriate for the sample with T > N as in the case of this study (Baltagi, 2008). 
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TABLES 
Table IV.1: Unit root tests for variables 
 LLC (p-value) M-W (p-value) CIPS (p-value) 
ln FDI 0.04 0.65 0.64 
ln GDP 0.42 0.80 0.72 
ln TAX 0.01 0.01 0.47 
ln COST 0.01 0.01 0.43 
ln SKILL 0.43 0.99 0.84 
ln OPEN 0.01 0.01 0.85 
ln FER 0.01 0.01 0.03 
ln TC 0.01 0.03 0.97 
ln RISK 0.01 0.62 0.31 
Note: The lag length of the unit root tests is three. This study experimented with 
different lag lengths up to order three: the results did not change significantly. 
 
 
Table IV.2: Unit root tests for the first difference of variables 
 LLC (p-value) M-W (p-value) CIPS (p-value) 
∆ ln FDI 0.01 0.01 0.01 
∆ lnGDP 0.01 0.01 0.02 
∆ lnTAX 0.01 0.01 0.01 
∆ ln COST 0.01 0.01 0.01 
∆ ln SKILL 0.01 0.02 0.01 
∆ lnOPEN 0.01 0.01 0.01 
∆ lnTC 0.01 0.01 0.01 
∆ lnRISK 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: The lag length of the unit root tests is three. This study experimented with 
different lag lengths up to order three: the results did not change significantly. 
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Table IV.3: 
The estimation of the models using one-year lagged values for explanatory variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 POLS FE MG CCEP CCEMG 
ln GDPF/ 1.09 2.26 0.82 0.66 0.41 
 (0.18) (0.71) (0.32) (0.42) (0.77) 
ln TAXF/ -0.70 -0.14 -0.31 -0.16 -0.08 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) 
ln COSTF/ -1.56 0.81 0.06 0.40 0.22 
 (0.69) (0.43) (0.15) (0.23) (0.50) 
ln SKILLF/ 0.70 0.62 0.11 0.25 -0.39 
 (1.18) (0.52) (0.37) (0.31) (0.50) 
ln OPENF/ 1.34 1.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.15 
 (0.54) (0.63) (0.21) (0.27) (0.36) 
ln FERF/ -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.52) 
ln TCF/ -1.62 1.24 0.10 -1.19 0.03 
 (0.45) (0.93) (1.51) (0.49) (0.65) 
ln RISKF/ 1.17 -0.21 0.24 -0.36 0.72 
 (0.93) (0.54) (0.43) (0.26) (0.40) 
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 
RMSE 0.8127 0.3528 0.1330 0.1650 0.0822 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In POLS and FE regressions, the reported 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country. Hausman test suggests 
choose the FE estimator over the RE estimator (p-value=0.01). GDP denotes the host country’s 
market size, TAX relative tax rates, COST relative labour costs, SKILL relative skilled labour, 
OPEN the host country’s openness, FER fluctuations of the exchange rate, TC trade costs, RISK 
the host country’s political risks. RMSE is root mean squared error. 
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Table IV.4: 
The estimation of the models using two-year lagged values for explanatory variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 POLS FE MG CCEP CCEMG 
ln GDPF1 1.45 2.29 1.48 0.72 1.47 
 (0.17) (0.79) (0.48) (0.38) (0.53) 
ln TAXF1 -0.72 -0.21 -0.14 -0.46 -0.50 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.11) (0.21) 
ln COSTF1 -1.98 0.75 -0.42 0.22 0.15 
 (0.73) (0.47) (0.16) (0.21) (0.58) 
ln SKILLF1 0.99 0.59 -0.04 0.50 0.46 
 (1.17) (0.61) (0.45) (0.27) (0.42) 
ln OPENF1 1.67 1.44 -0.34 0.57 -0.07 
 (0.54) (0.66) (0.34) (0.25) (0.60) 
ln FERF1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ln TCF1 -0.54 1.39 0.44 -0.02 -0.96 
 (0.46) (0.95) (0.45) (0.45) (0.62) 
ln RISKF1 1.99 0.01 0.57 0.28 0.68 
 (1.15) (0.54) (0.33) (0.23) (0.37) 
Observations 567 567 567 567 567 
RMSE 0.8733 0.3491 0.1268 0.1331 0.0608 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In POLS and FE regressions, the reported 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country. Hausman test suggests 
choose the FE estimator over the RE estimator (p-value=0.01). GDP denotes the host country’s 
market size, TAX relative tax rates, COST relative labour costs, SKILL relative skilled labour, 
OPEN the host country’s openness, FER fluctuations of the exchange rate, TC trade costs, RISK 
the host country’s political risks. RMSE is root mean squared error. 
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Table IV.5: Unit root tests for the estimated residuals 
 POLS FE MG CCEP CCEMG 
LLC test (p-value) 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
M-W test (p-value) 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CIPS test (p-value) 0.95 0.93 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: The lag length of the unit root tests is three. This study experimented with different lag 
lengths up to order three: the results did not change significantly. 
 
Table IV.6: Cross dependence tests for the estimated residuals 
 POLS FE MG CCEP CCEMG 
CD test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.88 
Note: CD test is Pesaran (2004) test with the null hypothesis of cross-section independence.  
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: 
List of countries in the sample 
Australia Germany New Zealand 
Austria Greece Norway 
Belgium Ireland Portugal 
Canada Italy Spain 
Demark Japan Sweden 
Finland Luxembourg Switzerland 
France Netherlands United Kingdom 
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Appendix 2: Plot of variables over time 
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Appendix 3: 
Plot of first difference of variables over time 
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Appendix 4:  
The estimation using CIF/FOB ratio as a measure of trade costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 POLS FE MG CCEP CCEMG 
ln GDPF1 1.45 1.97 1.02 0.77 1.53 
 (0.17) (0.75) (0.61) (0.38) (0.67) 
ln TAXF1 -0.72 -0.17 -0.08 -0.34 -0.31 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.15) (0.11) (0.19) 
ln COSTF1 -1.98 0.66 -0.40 0.11 0.30 
 (0.73) (0.44) (0.18) (0.21) (0.54) 
ln SKILLF1 0.99 0.72 0.32 0.58 0.38 
 (1.17) (0.68) (0.46) (0.27) (0.47) 
ln OPENF1 1.67 1.27 -0.31 0.40 0.12 
 (0.54) (0.61) (0.33) (0.25) (0.57) 
ln FERF1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
lnCIF/FOBF1 -0.54 0.42 0.07 0.03 0.01 
 (0.46) (0.29) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) 
ln RISKF1 1.99 0.30 0.45 0.27 0.73 
 (1.15) (0.41) (0.25) (0.23) (0.35) 
Observations 567 567 567 567 567 
RMSE 0.8733 0.3490 0.1236 0.1332 0.0627 
LLC test (p-value) 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
M-W test (p-value) 0.22 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CIPS test (p-value) 0.95 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CD test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.59 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In POLS and FE regressions, the reported standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by country. Hausman test suggests choose the FE 
estimator over the RE estimator (p-value=0.01). GDP denotes the host country’s market size, TAX 
relative tax rates, COST relative labour costs, SKILL relative skilled labour, OPEN the host country’s 
openness, FER fluctuations of the exchange rate, CIF/FOB trade costs, RISK the host country’s 
political risks. RMSE is root mean squared error. The lag length of the LLC, M-W, CIPS tests is 
three; this study experimented with different lag lengths up to order three: the results did not change 
significantly. CD test is Pesaran (2004) test with the null hypothesis of cross-section independence. 
 
